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MANIPULATION OF SHARE PRIORITIES
-The Record of 79 Listed Securities
BY ALFRED F. CONARD*
"This stock is prior to all others, bears 7% cumulative dividends,
has a liquidation preference of $110 and accrued dividends, and is
entitled to a sinking fund of $50,000 a year, unless a majority of the
class which you, as purchaser, have joined, should change its collective
mind, in which case this stock is no better than second preferred and
perhaps worse, bears 1% dividends which are non-cumulative, has
no liquidation or sinking fund rights, and will lose all dividends that
shall have been passed before the majority has made up its mind to
terminate your rights."
This inscription, suggests Mr. Arno Becht, should be placed on
each preferred share certificate by a candid issuer.' Other scholars
have been similarly critical of preferred share manipulation.2
Investors, who seldom read law reviews, continue to put their
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The author acknowledges the
contribution of the following members of the Illinois Bar who, as senior stu-
dents at the University of Illinois College of Law, gathered much of the data
on which the study is based:
Edward J. Connor, Chicago William L. Randolph, Macomb
Robert B. Karkow, Wilmette Herbert B. Schuh, Bement
The author has verified only a fraction, of the data, and submits this study in
the belief that the inferences drawn are generally correct, although some minor
errors in the basic data are probable.
1. Becht, Alteration of Accrued Dividends, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 363, 565, 583
(1951). Mr. Becht has rounded out a complete coverage of preferred share
rights with two other articles: Corporate Charter Amendments: Issues of
Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COL. L. REv. 900 (1950);
Changes in Interests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amend-
ments Reducing Capital, and Altering Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking
Fund Provisions, 36 CoR. L.Q. 1 (1950). This triad of monographs appears
to supersede Mr. Becht's earlier study, The Power to Remove Accrued Divi-
dends by Charter Amendment, 40 COL. L. REV. 633 (1940).
2. Primary credit for stimulating analytic thought on the preferred share
manipulation belongs to the late E. Merrick Dodd of Harvard Law School,
by reason of the following articles and books: Purchase and Redemption by
a Corporation of its Own Shares, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 697, 725-726 (1941);
Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HAv. L. R.v. 780 (1942); The Relative
Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders in Recapitalization Plans under
Public Utility Holding Company Act, 57 H=Rv. L. REv. 295 (1944); Accrued
Dividends in Delaware-from Vested Right to Mirage, 57 HARv. L. REV. 894
(1944); CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (with De Forest
Billyou, 1950); CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1294-1378 (with Ralph J. Baker,
1951).
Other outstanding contributions to the subject are: Billyou, Priority Rights of
Preferred and Common Shares in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 65 HARV. L. REv.
93 (1951), 26 J.N.A. REF. BANi. 67 (1952); Lattin, A Primer on Fundamental
Corporate Changes, 1 WEST. RES. L. REV. 3 (1949); Latty, Fairness-The Focal
Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 1 (1942); Latty,
Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes in Senior Shares,
19 U. of Cm. L. REV. 759 (1952), Walter, Fairness-A Disappearing Doctrine, 29
B. U. L. REV. 453 (1949).
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money into preferred stocks. In the last five reported years, approxi-
mately 3 billion of dollars worth of preferred shares have been offered
to the public, or more than a third of the value of all stock offered.3
Can Mr. Becht and the investors both be right?
Presumably the investors are directing their attention to different
aspects of preferred stock than is Mr. Becht. Like other lawyers, he
is considering what managements can do to preferred shareholders
if they do their worst. His conclusions are based on the records of
cases which have been fought through to judicial decision.
The investors, if they consider anything at all, would properly
direct their attention to what is likely to happen, or what has happened
most frequently in the past. On this point there is little information in
the law reviews or, so far as we have discovered, in financial litera-
ture. This paper reports on an attempt to find out how frequently the
investor in preferred stocks is subjected to the manipulations which
legal analysts have described. It is based on the record made from
1932 through 1951 by 79 preferred stocks which were listed on the
New York Stock Exchange. 4
ABSTINENCE FROM MANIPULATION
As we surveyed the practices of the market place, we were struck
by the variety of maneuvers taking place. Which should we call
manipulation?
As usual, it is easier to define what is not manipulation. Of course,
if shares were paid their dividends through the twenty years, and
no changes were made in capital structure, there was no manipulation.
Neither did we find manipulation if the shares were called in for
redemption in accordance with their terms. We concluded also that
there was no manipulation if the shares went into default, so long
as nothing was done to alter their priorities. The charter did not
promise that dividends would be paid, but only that they would have
priority of payment. Likewise, we felt there was no manipulation
even if the company failed and was liquidated, so long as the common
shares received no benefit or prospect of it, without prior satisfaction
of the claims of preferred.
3. SEC, Statistical Bulletin (monthly) presents the following totals of
offerings for cash of new corporate securities (in millions of dollars):
1952 1951 1950 1949 1948
Total corporate 9,852 7,741 6,361 6,052 7,078
Bonds 7,649 5,691 4,920 4,890 5,973
Preferred stock 564 838 631 425 492
Common stock 1,369 1,212 811 736 614
4. The issues were chosen from the New York Stock Exchange market
report for 1932 as printed in 136 COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE 101-
102 (1933). Selections were made at random from the Railroads list, and
from the Industrials list, but the distribution between lists was not random,
and is probably weighted in favor of the Railroads list.
A tabulation of the securities studied is furnished at the end of this article.
They will henceforth be cited by an abbreviation of the issuer's name.
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By these tests we found that 45 of the 79 issues studied escaped
manipulation. The 45 classified themselves as follows:
Never passed. a year's common dividends 135
Passed common, but never passed preferred 76
Passed preferred, but made up all arrears 147
Liquidated or reorganized, without violation of priorities 78
Passed preferred, and still in arrears without alteration of
rights on December 31, 1951 49
Analyzed in this way, the Abstinence Roll of Honor shrinks con-
siderably. A cynic might say it consists largely of those who never
had a chance (where neither junior nor senior shares obtained any
benefits), and those who were never thirsty (arrears on preferred
never accrued). The cynic will take pleasure in noting that in at
least two of the companies which were still in arrears at the end of
the observed period, subsequent proceedings indicate the probability
of manipulation of preferred priorities.10
Some credit must be given, however, to the companies which never
passed preferred dividends, despite the passing of common for periods
from 1 to 5 years. There are others which stopped preferred dividends
much more promptly and followed with manipulation of preferred
rights.
Most interesting are the 14 companies which paid up their preferred
arrears in full. While some had arrearages of less than a year, six
of them had back dividends of five years or more, and three had
arrearages of 13, 14, and 15 years, respectively." In most cases, we
5. Abraham & Straus General Motors
American Tobacco Liggett & Myers
Bangor & Aroostook Loew's
City Ice & Fuel National Biscuit
Commercial Investment Trust Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Duplan Silk South Porto Rico Sugar
General Cigar
6. Beatrice Creamery Crown Cork & Seal
Bloomingdale Bros. General Railway Signal
Century Ribbon Mills International Printing Ink
Consolidated Oil
7. Associated Dry Goods Houdaille-Hershey
American Smelting Interstate Dept. Stores
Brooklyn & Queens Transit N. Y., C. & St. L. R. R.
Budd Manufacturing Norwalk Tire & Rubber
Byers (A.M.) Co. Tidewater Oil
Gotham Hosiery U. S. Steel
Guantanamo Sugar Virginia-Carolina Chemical
8. Chicago Great Western Mallinson (H.R.) Corp.
Chicago Rock Island Market St. Ry.
Havana Electric Pierce Oil
Producers & Refiners
9. American & Foreign Power Missouri-Kansas-Texas
International Railways Western Pacific
10. American & Foreign Power; Western Pacific.




have no clue as to what induced the management to pay up, while
other managements were blithely funding or writing off preferred
shareholders' claims. In the 13-year case, however, we know that the
management first offered shareholders an exchange of prior preferred,
which no shareholder accepted. After this rebuff, the directors came
through with $97 in back dividends per share.12
In the 15-year case, a proposed amendment was adopted to give the
preferred shareholders a small bond and several shares of common,
but was enjoined by the New Jersey Court of Chancery.13 Two years
later, the company offered preferred holders a voluntary choice be-
tween full payment of arrearages and call price, or an exchange for
new preferred stock. About a third of the shares elected payment,
amounting to $227 per share.
THE GAmBITS OF MANIPULATION
Manipulation, as we decided to use the term, means any device for
evading the priorities promised to a preferred shareholder. To evade
a priority is to pay a junior shareholder before the senior shareholder
has had all the dividends or liquidation values, or both, which were
specified as prior to junior share payments. It will be easier to illus-
trate than to particularize further. We found 34 cases of manipulation,
as compared with the 45 cases, already described, of "abstinence."
The most direct manipulative device is amendment. But by changing
the terms of the charter, the clause providing for cumulative priority
may be rewritten to provide for less priority, or none. The same
thing may be done in a slightly more plausible form by "reclassifying"
the outstanding shares-that is, changing from the kind of shares
they were to a new kind, with different (and lesser) rights.
A slightly more sophisticated device for escaping the shackles of
priority is merger or consolidation. By this means, a corporation with
dividend arrearages combines with another corporation, creating what
is (in substance, if not in theory) a new corporation with new charter
provisions. In this metamorphosis, the scaly skin of arrearages is
always left behind.
Amendment and merger are accomplished by authority of corpora-
tion laws, always requiring some sort of formal adoption by a vote of
shareholders, but not incurring official supervision unless an aggrieved
party takes his case to court. In contrast to these procedures of ma-
jority rule stand the officially supervised procedures of "reorganiza-
tion." Most of the reorganizations encountered took place in the Court
of Bankruptcy. Two were effected under the Public Utility Holding
12. Budd Manufacturing. All facts, as usual, from various annual volumes
of MooDY'S MANUAL OF INVESTMENTS.




Company Act. Although the reorganizations sometimes employed the
means of amendment, merger or consolidation, sale of assets, or dis-
solution, we have ignored those variations because the dominant note
seemed to be supplied by the judicial or administrative supervision.
Amendment, reorganization, and merger or consolidation, are all
"compulsory" procedures, in that they are binding on minority in-
vestors who do not consent. But manipulation can also be effected by
"voluntary" measures, in which each affected shareholder's assent
is obtained to the change in his rights. The principal voluntary de-
vice is the "exchange offer," in which the holder of accrued dividend
rights is offered a trade for new securities, with a strong hint that
dividends will be paid on the new security if the exchange is taken.
Often the proffered exchange is a new preferred stock, prior to the
one already held, which has the dual function of a carrot in front and
a goad behind.
Most subtle of all methods of getting rid of the preferred share-
holders' priorities is the purchase of their shares in the open market.14
When dividends are current, we have not regarded purchase as a
"manipulation," although something might be said on this point. But
when the dividends are in arrears, the use of funds for purchase of
shares automatically diminishes the possibility that dividends will
ever be paid, by reducing the fund from which they would come.
Conversely, the withholding of dividends helps to provide the fund
for purchase at the same time that it reduces the market price of
the shares.
The principal problem in analyzing the use of this manipulative
method is the difficulty in detecting it. Share purchases are not re-
ported in the usual financial records, and can only be inferred. Some-
times the evidence is found in the balance sheet statement of capital
stock outstanding, or of treasury stock. If a holding company makes
the purchase, the effect is similar, but the fact will not appear on the
subject company's balance sheet; it may be separately reported if the
holding company is subject to the Public Utility Holding Company
Act. If controlling common shareholders make the purchase, the effect
is again similar, but will not appear at all in the usual financial re-
ports. If the purchasers cause the preferred shares to be called with
full discharge of arrearages, the case will appear to be one of non-
manipulation, though it is actually an instance of manipulation. No
such cases were detected in the present study.
The following table indicates the frequency of the various manipu-
lation devices which we detected:
14. See Dodd, Purchase and Redemption by a Corporation of its Own




Merger or consolidation 510
Reorganization (Bankruptcy 7, PU-CA 2) 917
Voluntary exchange (With prior preferred, 5; without, 4) 918
Purchase of delinquent shares (By subject corporation, 2;
by holding company, 1) 319
Total 34
BENEFIT AND DETMENT
Manipulation, by definition, imposes some detriment on the shares
manipulated. But the detriment is usually accompanied by some form
of benefit, to make it more palatable. What we want to know is, what
is the net effect?
The extent of benefit and detriment are matters of opinion. All
who have read the recapitalization and reorganization cases are acutely
aware of the infinite scope for speculation and dispute on every ele-
ment of valuation. For our purposes, we have adopted a cruder and
simpler test, using the aid of hind-sight.
The test is in terms of money received, or obtainable on the market.
If the manipulated investor received as much income from his ma-
nipulated security as he was entitled to receive, in priority, on his
original share, we say he suffered no detriment. Or if his old security
was callable, and he received new securities which were worth on
the market what his old share could be called for, we say he was not
hurt. In each case we follow the stock to December 31, 1951, ignoring
what may have happened since that date.
No net detriment-new securities worth call price. Hercules Powder
Company performed an interesting manipulation which reduced the
dividend of its preferred shares without working any net detriment
15. American Hide and Leather Gimbel Brothers
Atlas Powder Goodrich, B. F.
Bucyrus-Erie Hercules Powder
Fairbanks, Morse Remington Rand
The "manipulations" in Atlas Powder and Hercules Powder were found
to be non-detrimental, as explained infra, pp. 60-61.
16. American Locomotive Otis Steel
Gulf, Mobile & Northern Spang, Chalfant
Minneapolis-Moline
17. American-La France (bankruptcy) McLellan Stores (bankruptcy)
American Writing Paper (bankruptcy) Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Colorado Fuel & Iron (bankruptcy) (bankruptcy)
Electric Power & Light (PUHCA) Pierce-Arrow (bankruptcy)
General Gas & Electric (PUHCA) Symington (bankruptcy)
18. American Woolen (pr. pf.) Revere Copper & Brass
Du Pont de Nemours Spear & Co.
International Paper & Power Twin City Rapid Transit (pr. pf.)
Lehigh Valley Coal (pr. pf.) White Sewing Machine (pr. pf.)
Mengel Co. (pr. pf.)
The "manipulation" in Du Pont de Nemours was found to be non-detri-
mental, as explained infra, pp. 60-61.
19. New York Steam (purchase by holding company)
Skelly Oil United Dyewood
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to the holders, by our test. In 1936, the stock was fully current on
its $7 dividend, and was callable at 120. By amendment, the dividend
was reduced from $7 to $6, but at the same time callability was sus-
pended for five years. During the next five years, the stock sold
generally for 125 and upwards, never touching its former call
price. Since the company could have called the old shares at
120, and the holder could always sell his amended shares for more
than that, we find the holder suffered no net detriment. By 1945, the
$6 preferred had become callable, again at 120, and again the compai4y
reduced the dividend by one dollar, suspending callability as before.
As before, the amended shares never sold as low as the old call price
during the non-callable period. And so, again, the holder lost nothing
by manipulation which could not have been taken from him without it.
No net detriment-new dividends equal to old priorities. Fairbanks-
Morse 7% preferred illustrates a manipulation which proved non-
detrimental for different reasons. In 1935, each preferred shareholder
had his claim to $7 a year plus $24.50 of back dividends, and was sub-
ject to call at $110. In that year he was given in exchange one new
share of $6 preferred, plus one share of common, plus $2.00 in cash.
Three years later, the new preferred was called at $105. At this point,
the former holder of $7 preferred might be said to be $27.00 behind the
priorities to which he was originally entitled.20 But in the next 13
years he received $32.00 in dividends, and had two shares of common
left, each worth about $25.00.21 So he was better off than if his $7
stock had been called in 1938 (as the new stock was) without the
prior exchange. The common shareholders, in their turn, were worse
off, since they had to share the company's profits in perpetuity with
the former preferred shareholders.
Potential future benefit from present dividend rate. In another
group of cases, the preferred shareholders had suffered a net detriment
at the close of 1951, but they stood to benefit eventually if the 1951
dividend rate should continue indefinitely.
One of the most cheerful examples of this category is the 7% pre-
ferred of Otis Steel Co. With $36.75 in arrears, the holders were
offered 1.28 shares of new $5.50 convertible preferred. The new
stock yielded just $7.04, but a chance of compensation for arrearages
lay in the conversion privilege. A few years later, the company merged
with Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. The former holders of 7 % preferred
in Otis now found themselves holding various fractions of three
20. If the original shares had been called when the new shares were, the
holder would have been additionally entitled to the $24.50 arrearage plus
the $5 difference between his old and new call prices, plus the $3.00 difference
between this old and new dividend rate for 3 years. Against this, he had
received $2.00 cash in the recapitalization, plus $3.50 in dividends on his share
of common.
21. The common shares had been split 2 for 1 in 1951.
19541
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different classes of shares in Jones & Laughlin, the dividends from
all of which had reached an annual rate of slightly over $11.00 in
1951. Obviously if this rate of earning were to continue, the holders
would be better off than if they still held 7 % preferred, callable at 110.
There are other instances of the same possibility, in which the
former preferred shareholders have much further to go to catch up
with their arrearages, and are gaining at a much slower rate.
Remote possibility of benefit, if dividends increase. In every case
where a former preferred shareholder receives a participating security
in exchange, there is a theoretical possibility that he will ultimately
benefit. But if his best rate of income through post-war years re-
mained below his old preferred rate, the possibility must be regarded
as very remote.
A dismal instance is the 7 % cumulative preferred stock of American
Hide and Leather. In 1935, its arrears of dividends amounted to
$217.75 per share. In this year, each holder was given one new share
carrying a $3.00 preference, and four new shares of common. After
eleven more years passed without common dividends, the company
commenced paying 50 cents a common share. Total dividends on the
one preferred share and the four common shares then totalled $5.00.
At this rate, each year finds the shareholder further and further away
from realizing the $7 which he had originally expected in priority
to common dividends. The possibility that total dividends will exceed
$7 for long enough to make up the delinquent $217.75 (to say nothing
of subsequent accretions) seems remote.
Benefit impossible under new capital structure. There remains a
group of cases in which not even the rosiest view of the future con-
tains a vision of benefit resulting from the preferred share manipula-
tion. In some of these, the preferred holders exchanged their delin-
quent old shares for new ones which were wholly non-participating,
and which carried a lower dividend than the shares they surrendered.
For example, each holder of 6% preferred stock in Spang, Chalfant
& Company (with $3 in arrears) emerged from a consolidation with
one share of 5Y % non-participating preferred in National Supply
Company.
Benefit is also impossible for holders of shares in companies which
transmuted their shares and later were liquidated in insolvency.
Benefit impossible-shares purchased. Another group of manipula-
tion victims who will never reap a benefit are those whose shares were
purchased by the company (or its parent) while the dividends were
in arrears.
The holders of Skelly Oil 6% preferred furnish an instance. In
1932, 1933, and 1934 the company was paying no preferred dividends,
but found cash to buy in outstanding preferred shares aggregating
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nearly $2,000,000 in par value. The market was ranging from 12 to 68.
A few years later (1937) the company resumed dividends on common,
having retired the unpurchased preferred shares. Since the shares
were callable at 103, the preferred shareholders might have imagined
that the company could not pay its common shareholders until it first
paid its preferred their prior dividends, or else paid them off at call.
But the company had found a way around both arrears and call for
less than $68 per share. The sellers, of course, had no prospect of
making up their loss in some other way.
Summary. In terms of benefit and detriment, the following distribu-
tion appeared among the 34 manipulation cases:
Net benefit-new securities worth call price 322
Net benefit-new dividends equal to old priorities 4n
Potential future benefit from present dividend rate 924
Remote possibility of benefit, if dividends increase 1025
Benefit impossible under new capital structure 526
Benefit impossible-shares purchased 327
Total 34
The over-all picture is not too bright. By the close of the phe-
nomenally profitable decade from 1942 through 1951, only 7 of the 34
manipulations (that it, the two "net benefit" classes listed above) had
22. Atlas Powder






American Woolen Company falls in the class of "net benefit" only for those
shareholders who made the best choices at the best times. In 1936, preferred
shareholders were given an opportunity to exchange for preferred shares
which were convertible to common. If they both exchanged and converted
immediately, they were benefitted. But if they exchanged and delayed con-
version, they missed the 1946 common dividend, and did not realize the equal
of their old priorities.
24. American Locomotive Minneapolis-Moline
Electric Power & Light Otis Steel
Goodrich, B. F. Twin City Rapid Transit
International Paper & Power White Sewing Machine
Mengel Co.
25. American Hide & Leather Gulf, Mobile & Northern
American-La France Lehigh Valley Coal & Iron
American Writing Paper Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Colorado Fuel & Iron Remington Rand
Gimbel Bros. Symington
26. General Gas & Electric
Pierce Arrow (liquidated)
Revere Copper & Brass
Spang, ChafantSpear & Co.





proved non-detrimental. A more impressive total of 18 (the last three
classes) had brought nothing but detriment in an era of prosperity
whose repetition cannot be foreseen.
OCCASIONS FOR MANIPULATION
With the facts in, what clues can we give an investor as to when
manipulation is to be expected?
Of course, if the common shareholders suffer no distress, the pre-
ferred are likely to be spared as well. We found 16 companies in which
common dividends were paid every year. Curiously enough, two of
the companies did manipulate preferred rights even under these
circumstances. But these manipulations were not detrimental. They
consisted of reductions of dividend rate, fully compensated for by
suspensions of calability.
There were 63 cases in which common dividends were passed for
a year or more. In only 8 of these did preferred escape passing. In
only one of the eight did the preferred undergo a manipulation, and
it was a harmless one.
So we may say that if preferred dividends are never passed, the
investor is in no real danger from manipulation. Unfortunately, we
have no way of predicting corporate action on preferred dividends.
In 7 of the 8 cases where common were passed while preferred were
paid, the common passed only one or two years.28 It appears that when
common shareholders wait more than 2 years, preferred are likely
to share their misery.
When the preferred do pass, the fat is in the fire. In our sample
of 56 defaulted preferred shares, only 14 were fully paid up, while
31 were manipulated. The remaining 11 are cases of wiping out pre-
ferred without manipulation, or of unfinished histories. And in the
13 "honor roll" cases, the failure to manipulate was blocked by share-
holder stubbornness in at least two cases.
There is a slight correlation between the magnitude of arrearages
and the disposition to manipulate. Make-ups of arrearages under two
years were more common than manipulations of such arrearages. But
manipulations of arrearages over ten years were more common than
make-ups; and at least two of the three make-ups of over 10 years
were forced by shareholder resistance.
29
We may summarize the dividend background of the cases as follows:
Common dividends never passed for whole year
Non-manipulated 1330
28. The exception was Century Ribbon Mills, which passed common divi-
dends for 5 years while paying preferred.
29. Budd Manufacturing and Guantanamo Sugar, discussed supra, pp. 57-58.
30. Abraham and Straus General Cigar
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Manipulated (but not detrimentally)
Common dividends passed, but preferred never passed
Non-manipulated
Manipulated (but not detrimentally)
Common and preferred dividends passed
Dividends made up
Manipulated





Restrictions on organic change. The chief bulwark which state
courts have thrown up against preferred share manipulation is made
of rules against divesting vested rights, especially if the amendment
method is chosen. The history of these restrictions is well-known 3 7
American Smelting General Motors
American Tobacco Liggett & Myers
Bangor & Aroostook Loew's
City Ice & Fuel National Biscuit
Commercial Investment Trust Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Duplan Silk Southern Porto Rico Sugar
31. Du Pont de Nemours
Hercules Powder
32. Beatrice Creamery Crown Cork & Seal
Bloomingdale Bros. General Railway Signal
Century Ribbon Mills International Printing Ink
Consolidated Oil
33. Atlas Powder
34. Associated Dry Goods Houdaille-Hershey
American Smelting Interstate Department Stores
Brooklyn-Queens Rapid Transit N. Y., C. & St. L. R. R.
Budd Manufacturing Norwalk Tire & Rubber
Byers (A.M.) Tidewater Oil
Gotham Silk U. S. Steel
Guantanamo Sugar Virginia-Carolina Chemical
35. American Hide & Leather Mengel Co.
American-La France Minneapolis-Moline
American Locomotive New York Steam
American Woolen Otis Steel
American Writing Paper Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Bucyrus-Erie Pierce-Arrow
Colorado Fuel & Iron Remington-Rand
Electric Power & Light Revere Copper & Brass
Fairbanks, Morse Skelly Oil
General Gas & Electric Spang, Chalfant
Gimbel Bros. Spear & Co.
Goodrich, B. F. Symington
Gulf, Mobile & Northern Twin City Rapid Transit
International Paper & Power United Dyewood
LeHigh Valley Coal & Iron White Sewing Machine
McLellan Stores
36. American & Foreign Power Market Street Railway
Chicago Great Western Missouri-Kansas-Texas
Chicago Rock Island Pierce Oil
Havana Electric Producers & Refiners
International Railways Western Pacific
Mallinson (H.R.)
37. See works of Becht and Dodd, supra notes 1 and 2.
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Where amendment was refused, merger was allowed. Besides, legisla-
tures moved in to authorize specifically the adoption of divesting
amendments. 3 8
The survey adds slightly to the history made by the cases. It shows
that voluntary exchange plans can hurdle the obstacle imposed by
limits on amending power, even without the aid of "prior preferred."30
A method still more elusive than the voluntary exchange is a policy
of buying in shares on the open market, while withholding payment
of dividends. If shareholders are stubborn, the management can out-
wait them. A striking illustration is New York Steam, which has paid
neither preferred nor common dividends since 1937. In 1948, when
there were earnings of $11.91 and back dividends of $66 per share,
the money stayed in the till while the parent company bought in a
few more shares, presumably at prices under par.
40
The examples indicate that there is little real protection to pre-
ferred holders in forbidding manipulation by amendment. The man-
agement can find other means to reach its ends.
If amendment of priorities were impossible, it would have blocked
the particular avenue chosen for some of the manipulations found in
the survey. But it would also have blocked the means used for the
two most beneficial manipulations found. The reclassifications of
Hercules and Atlas Powdet Companies, both of which appeared to
benefit rather than harm preferred holders, were effected by amend-
ment.
Official regulation. For some years, commentators on priorities
manipulation have been hinting that official regulation is needed, in
order to control the tyranny of majority rule. Some of the proposals
involve administrative control; some, judicial. Some of them con-
template that certain defined categories of manipulation would come
under review-for instance, all amendments which effect priorities,
or all mergers and consolidations involving two or more classes of
stock.
41
The present study awakens serious doubts as to the effectiveness
of these proposals. It shows that manipulation does not depend on
formal organic changes. It can be accomplished by wholly "voluntary"
methods like share-exchange, or open-market purchase. If the price
38. See statutes involved in McNulty v. W. & J. Sloane. 184 Misc. 835, 54
N.Y.S.2d 253 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Wheatley v. A. I. Root Co., 147 Ohio St. 127,
69 N.E.2d 187 (1946).
39. See cases cited note 18, supra.
40. The stock had been barred from exchange trading since 1937, when
Consolidated Edison acquired 97% of it. The last over-the-counter quotation
was reported for 1946, at 96. MooDY's PUBLIC UTLrrIEs 957 et. seq. (1949).
41. The regulatory possibilities are discussed in Latty, Exploration of Legis-
lative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes in Senior Shares, 19 U. or CHI. L.
REV. 759 (1952).
42. Regulation as a cure is also rejected by Becht, Alteration of Accrued
Dividends, 49 MicH. L. REv. 565, 588-94 (1951).
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of preferred is depressed by non-payment of dividends, and majority
investors buy it for their personal accounts, the manipulation escapes
any regulation known to legal literature.43
Not only is regulation (in any form yet seen) readily evaded,
but it appears rather ineffective. The present study encountered 9
security issues in which the manipulation took place under the control
of the Court of Bankruptcy, or the SEC. According to our crude test
of benefit and detriment, the cases resulted as follows:
Net benefit 144
Potential benefit 145
Remote possibility of benefit 546
Benefit impossible 247
This is a worse record than was made by the unregulated manipula-
tions! 48
The most effective shareholder protection which appeared in the
cases studied was afforded by an individual shareholder's suit in a
state which applied a strict standard of fairness. The case was Wessel
v. Guantanamo Sugar,49 in which the New Jersey Court of Chancery
enjoined an unfavorable amendment. Shortly after, the company
redeemed the preferred with all back dividends, making the biggest
pay-off disclosed in our 79 cases.
The moral seems to be that shareholders can protect themselves
in the courts if the courts are prepared to apply a strict standard of
fairness. ° If the courts are not so prepared, not even the mountainous
43. The most closely analogous legal remedy seems to be the claim under
Rule X-10(B)5 of the Securities Exchange Commission; but cases under this
section seem to depend on failure to disclose facts, rather than open abuse of
power of control. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del.
1951).
44. McLellan Stores
45. Electric Power & Light
46. American-La France
American Writing Paper
Colorado Fuel & Iron
Philadelphia Rapid Transit
Symington
47. General Gas & Electric
Pierce-Arrow
48. Consider the following comparison Regulated Unregulated
No. % No. %
Net benefit 1 11 6 24
Potential benefit 1 11 8 32
Remote possibility of benefit 5 56 5 20
Benefit impossible 2 22 6 24
Total 9 100% 25 100%
49. Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 134 N.J. Eq. 271, 35 A.2d 215 (Ch.
1945).




heaps of 'paperwork which surrounded the Philadelphia Rapid Transit
case will protect the investor.
A standard of objectives for directors. This study suggests that the
prerequisite to control of manipulation is a standard of directors'
objectives. What is needed is a pronouncement of the extent to which
directors should seek the interests of preferred shareholders as against
common shareholders. By this standard, courts must test directors' ac-
tions in proposing amendments, mergers, voluntary exchanges, re-
organizations, their actions in purchasing shares, and their practices in
declaring or withholding dividends. All these kinds of action are
weapons in the war between the classes of shareholders; restrictions on
one weapon are of little effect if another is left free.
This suggestion puts the emphasis on directors' action, rather than
shareholders', in contrast with some suggestions that the problem
should be solved by educating shareholders through the proxy state-
ment.' No doubt an awake and informed body of shareholders is
desirable. But there is little evidence that shareholders can be awak-
ened, and there is certainly no way of insuring a small investor that
the thousands of his co-investors will respond to alerts. Moreover,
directors have means, by withholding dividends and purchasing stock
for the treasury (or for their personal accounts, or for affiliated com-
panies) to manipulate the preferred shares regardless of shareholders'
consent.
When shareholders do vote, they vote on proposals made by the
directors. Usually, they approve. So control is best exercised (if
there is to be any) on directors' actions in making proposals.
If a standard of fairness is to be effective, courts must be willing to
infer and evaluate the objectives of directors, rather than applying
what Latty has so aptly called "the Solid Citizen test.' ' 52 They must
not pass every action which does not harm the corporation, on the
theory that it is an exercise of "business judgment." This is like
letting a fox decide, by his business judgment, how many chickens
will be best for him. If "business judgment" means judgment that
benefits the fund or enterprise, nearly every withholding of income
and every reduction of investors' rights is good business judgment.
The only limitation would be the need to make future preferred stock
issues attractive to investors. But the more money a company retains,
the less need it has to attract stock investors.
The picture which emerges from most of the cases is one in which
shareholders of all classes accept whatever is offered them. Although
some judicial decisions speak of the necessity of obtaining junior
51. See Latty, Exploration of LegisZative Remedy for Prejudicial Changes
in Senior Shares, 19 U. oF Cui. L. R v. 759 (1952).
52. Id. at 762.
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shareholders' votes,53 no instance was found of rejection of a plan
by junior investors.
In consequence, the decision to manipulate, and the terms of ma-
nipulation, rest in the discretion of the directors. And that discretion
appears to be nearly boundless. At one extreme stand the directors
who seem to believe that they should honor priorities. After exer-
cising a reasonably free judgment as to whether there are funds
available for any kind of dividends, they pay these funds to the pre-
ferred shareholders. At the other extreme stand those who plainly
attempt to drive the hardest bargain with preferred holders that can
be driven. From one extreme to the other, the directors are likely
to be successful in the course they undertake to follow.
WHAT Is FAin?
The survey naturally could not show us what kind of treatment of
priority shareholders is fair. But we had hoped it would give some
clue to what managers or investors think is fair-some discernible
pattern of treatment of preferred share rights.
All it showed was contrasts. One management went to one extreme,
another to another. There were, for example, two department store
corporations, both having 7% preferred stock outstanding; both
commenced their preferred defaults early in 1932, and both resumed
common dividends within a year of each other (1943-1944). Asso-
ciated Dry Goods had $31.50 of arrears on its preferred dividends,
but it resumed regular payments without tampering with their rights.
Defaults came again in 1938 and 1939, sending arrears up to $40.25.
But arrearage payments were resumed in 1940, making the preferred
stock current by 1943, and common dividends were recommenced.
Gimbel Brothers, on the other hand, had only $25 in arrears in
1936 when it funded its arrears by exchanging each share of $7 pre-
ferred for 1/2 shares of $6 preferred. If this situation had continued,
the preferred holders would have recovered their arrearages (at 50c
a year) by 1986. But in 1944, with the new preferred shares current,
each $6 share was exchanged for 1 1/20 shares of $4.50 preferred.
Each former $7 shareholder would now get $5.90 per share. With this
saving on preferred dividends, the corporation resumed common divi-
dends.
No other pair of companies was found which matched as closely
as Associated Dry Goods and Gimble, but the same wide disparity in
management objectives appeared in many company histories. It seems
clear that some managements consider it their job to make the most
favorable arrangement for common shareholders that the preferred
holders can be persuaded to accept.
53. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 204 (D. Del. 1944).
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In rare instances, the preferred shareholders reject the offer. One
of two such instances discovered occurred in Budd Manufacturing.
The $7 preferred was $90 in arrears, and the management offered an
exchange of two new $5 shares for each old $7 share. This would have
upped the current dividend priority from $7 to $10, and the liquida-
tion priority from $110 to $200. All shareholders apparently declined
the offer.
But there are many more instances where less favorable propositions
were quickly snapped up by dividend-hungry preferred holders. For
example, Revere Copper $7 preferred was in arrears to the extent of
$38.50 per share when the holders were offered 1 1/3 shares of 51/%
preferred. This would give them an unchanged priority in current
dividends, and an increase in liquidation priority of about $33-less
than the arrearage. Three-fourths of them made the trade.
SUMMVARY
The power to emasculate share priorities is not a rusty legal weapon.
A 1932 purchaser of preferred shares on the New York Stock Exchange
had a less-than-even chance of escaping manipulation of his priorities
if his shares once fell into default. Most manipulations offer a the-
oretical opportunity of benefitting the preferred shareholder, but that
opportunity seldom materialized in the unusually profitable decade
ending with 1951.
The present study shows nothing about securities which are not
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. An attempt to study such
securities failed, for want of financial information. All the common
assumptions would seem to indicate that manipulation would go to
greater extremes in unlisted securities. Less information is available
to shareholders; controlling blocs are more readily bought by man-
agement without disclosure; there is less chance of a professional
striker interfering.
None of the legal inhibitions now existing give the preferred share-
holder much protection against manipulation. Proposals for increased
regulation seem to ignore the variety of devices to which manage-
ments resort. Proposals to strengthen opposition voters ignore the
same point, and also ignore the impossibility of overcoming mass
inertia. If control of manipulation is desirable, it must be done by
defining the duties of directors, in all the many ways they have of
applying pressure to shareholders. When a stricter standard of direc-
tors' conduct is adopted by the courts, a single shareholder will be




Abraham & Straus, Inc. (N.Y.), 7%
cum. pref.
American & Foreign Power Co., Inc.
(Me.), $7 cum. 2nd pref. A
American Hide & Leather Co. (N.J.),
7% cum. pref.
American-La France & Foamite Corp.
(N.Y.), 7% cum. pref.
American Locomotive Co. (N.Y.), 7%
cum. pref.
American Smelting & Refining Co.
(N.J.), 7% cum. pref.
American Tobacco Co. (N.J.), 6%
cum. pref.
American Woolen Co. (Mass.), 7%
cum. pref.
American Writing Paper Co. (Del.),
$6 cum. pref.
Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Va.),
7% cum. 2nd pref.
Atlas Powder Co. (Del.), 6% cum.
pref.
Bangor & Aroostook R. R. Co. (Me.),
7% cum. pref.
Beatrice Creamery Co. (Del.), 7%
cum. pref.
Bloomingdale Bros. Inc., 7% cum.
pref.
Brooklyn & Queens Transit Corp.
(N.Y.), pref.
Bucyrus-Erie Co. (Del.), 7% cum.
pref.
Budd Manufacturing Co. (Pa.), 7%
cum. pref.
Byers (A.M.) Co. (Pa.), 7% cum.
part. pref.
Century Ribbon Mills, Inc. (N.Y.),
7% cum. pref.
Chicago Great Western R.R. Co. (Ill.),
4% cum. pref.
Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co.
(Ill. & Ia.), 7% and 6% cum. pref.
City Ice & Fuel Co. (Ohio), 6k%
cum. pref.
Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. (Colo.), 8%
cum. pref.
Commercial Investment Trust Corp.
(Del.), 7% cum. first pref.
Consolidated Oil Corp. (N.Y.), 8%
cum. pref.
Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. (N.Y.),
$2.70 cum. pref.
Duplan Silk Corp. (Del.). 8% cum.
pref.
Du Pont (E.I.) de Nemours & Co.
(Del.), 6% cum. deb. stock
Electric Power & Light Corp. (Me.),
$6 and $7 cum. pref.
Fairbanks, Morse & Co. (Ill.), 7%
cum. pref.
General Cigar Co., Inc. (N.Y.), 7%
cum. pref.
General Gas & Electric Corp. (Del.),
$8, $7, and $6 pref., A & B
General Motors Corp. (Del.), $5 cum.
pref.
General Railway Signal Co. (N.Y.),
6% cum. pref.
Gimbel Bros., Inc. (N.Y.), 7% cuM.
pref.
Goodrich (B.F.) Co. (N.Y.), 7% cuM.
pref.
Gotham Silk Hosiery Co. (Del.), 7%
cum. pref.
Guantanamo Sugar Co. (N.J.), 8%
cum. pref.
Gulf. Mobile & Northern R. R. Co.
(Ala., Miss. & Tenn.), 6% cum. pref.
Havana Electric Ry. Co. (Me.), 6%
pref.
Hercules Powder Co. (Del.), 7% cum.
pref.
Houdaille-Hershey Corp. (Mich.),
$2.50 class A cony. pref.
International Paper & Power Co.
(Mass.), 7% and 6% cum. pref.
International Printing Ink Corp.
(Ohio), 6% cum. pref.
International Railways of Central
America (N.J.), 5% cum. part. pref.
Interstate Department Stores, Inc.
(Del.), 7% cum. pref.
Lehigh Valley Coal Corp. (Del.). 6%
cum. pref.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. (N.J.),
7% cum. pref.
Loew's, Inc. (Del.), $6.50 cum. pref.
Mallinson (H.R.) & Company, Inc.
(Del.), 7% cum. pref.
Market Street Railway Co. (Cal.),
6% cum. prior pref.
McLellan Stores Co. (Del.), 6% cum.
cony. pref. ser. A
Mengel Co. (N.J.), 7% cum. pref.
Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement
Co. (Del.), $6.50 cum. pref.
Missouri - Kansas - Texas R. R. Co.
(Mo.). 7% cum. pref., ser. A
National Biscuit Co. (N.J.), 7% cum.
pref.
New York, Chicago & St. L. R. R. Co.
(Ohio, N.Y., Pa., Ind. & Ill.), 6%
cum. pref., ser. A.
New York Steam Corp. (N.Y.), 6%
cum. pref.
Norwalk Tire & Rubber Co. (Conn.),
7% cum. pref.
Otis Steel Co. (Ohio). 7% cum. pref.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Cal.), 6%
cum. pref.
Philadelphia Rapid, Transit Co. (Pa.),
7% cum. pref.
Pierce-Arrow Motor Car Co. (N.Y.),
6% cum. pref.
Pierce Oil Corp. (Va.), 8% cum. cony.
pref.
Producers & Refiners' Corp. (Wyo.),
7% cum. part. pref.
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Remington Rand, Inc. (Del.), 8%
cum. 2nd pref.
Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. (Md.),
7% cum. pref.
Skelly Oil Co. (Del.), 6%1 cum. pref.
South Porto Rico Sugar Co. (N.J.),
8% cum. pref.
Spang, Chalfant & Co. (Pa.), 6% cum.
pref.
Spear & Co. (N.J.), 7% cum. pref.
Symington Company (Md.), Class A
Tide Water Association Oil Co. (Del.),
6% cum. cony. pref.
Twin City Rapid Transit Co. (N.J.),
7% cum. pref.
United Dyewood Corp. (Del.), 7%
cum. pref.
United States Steel Corp. (N.J.), 7%
cum. pref.
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.
(Va.), 7% cum. prior pref.
Western Pacific R. R. Co. (Del.), 6%
pref.
White Sewing Machine Corp. (Del.),
$4 cum. cony. pref.
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